Few Friends Russia Embraces Iran – CEPA

Russia once viewed the G-20 group of major economies as an important global forum for cooperation. more than this. Vladimir Putin will not be present at the Nov. 15-16 meeting in Bali, so it is highly unlikely that a face-to-face accusation by Western leaders will reveal his isolation.

It’s not that Russia has no friends, it’s that it has fewer friends than it did before all-out war against Ukraine began in February. Through supplies, it is reportedly approaching the Kremlin. And Iran, the more significant power, is now detectably strengthening its ties with Russia, with severe implications for the Middle East, nuclear non-proliferation, and sanctions evasion.

iranian people suicide drone Hitting Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and the deliberate arrival of Iranian ballistic missiles to bolster Russia’s provocative war against its European neighbors shows how profitable the Kremlin is ( and indifference to Tehran’s reputational damage).

The warming of the relationship comes decades, if not centuries of distrust. This mutual hesitation is a hallmark of bilateral relations, and vaunted cooperation is always accompanied by a sense of imperfection. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and, above all, its inability to achieve a quick victory has forced Iran to take advantage of Russia’s weaknesses and force the Putin regime to agree to broader cooperation in the economic and military spheres. It provided an important opportunity to work. So are Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russia’s involvement in Iran’s renewed negotiations on the revival of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designed to end Tehran’s nuclear-weapon-producing capabilities, was a major threat to the United States and its Characterized by the Allies as fairly positive. On several occasions, the Kremlin has pressured Iran to refrain from further moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons, killing any hope of restoring the nuclear deal.

Russia’s calculations were clear – it opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, a region already plagued by instability. Iran and Russia have long cooperated on many issues, from the South Caucasus to the Caspian Sea. However, the nature of Islamic regimes — their tradition of helping to fund and direct various foreign militias — and their willingness to arm their enemies make it dangerous to support the pursuit of nuclear technology. is.

The war in Ukraine may be changing all these calculations, and there is growing evidence to suggest that this is already happening. Since the first days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has resorted to extortion and threatened to undermine the JCPOA negotiations in Vienna. In June, Russia voted against when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) backed a resolution calling for Iran’s cooperation with the United Nations. He also remained silent when Iran turned off multiple IAEA cameras at its nuclear facility.

The Russian game is clear. He is deeply concerned about the war with Ukraine, effectively asking the West how much they care about Iran’s nuclear program. This potential geopolitical horse deal aligns with Putin’s approach to foreign affairs but gives little thought to a US-led approach. So far the West has resisted, but Russia knows the clock is ticking. Iran is perilously close to the famous breakout moment when its progress towards nuclear weapons will be irreversible.

Despite this intensification of ties, uncertainty remains in Iran-Russia relations. Iranians are generally skeptical of Russia’s strategic goals and interests in the Middle East. Even issues such as the provision of Iranian military drones to Russia are now confirmed by top leaders, while Iranian politicians are deeply concerned about supporting a very obviously immoral war of conquest. Moreover, Iranians see Russia as an imperialist that has, over the centuries, harmed their country as well as the West. The general Iranian opinion of Russia is largely negative. Despite official propaganda, about twice as many Iranians hold the Kremlin responsible for the war and the West.

But this tale of disbelief should not be exaggerated. Long-term development indicates an expanding scope for military and economic cooperation. For example, Iran and Russia are planning to expand bilateral trade and introduce the Mir payment system for commerce. Trade volume, which was $4 billion in 2021, could reach $6 billion in the ‘near future’.

Russia also wants to know how Iran has survived decades of sanctions regimes. The Islamic Republic has developed an extensive network of foreign front companies to conceal its trading activities from Western sanctions enforcers, with great success.

Iran expects Russia to return the favor. Its Air Force flies aging fighter planes purchased decades ago from the Soviet Union and the West. Prior to 2022, Russia was reluctant to offer its latest Su-35 fighter jets to Iran. Now, hints in Iranian media indicate that Russian calculus may be changing.Also, on November 8, the Iranian Noor news agency report Russian National Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev’s visit to Tehran to arrange the purchase of Iranian ballistic missiles.

Iran and Russia are now united in the negative. Both are subject to sanctions from Western countries and are seeking ways to circumvent these restrictions.

One route to achieving this is to improve north-south trade routes to connect Iran’s warm southern Gulf ports to Russia via Azerbaijan territory. The success of the Corridor is still uncertain, but the war in Ukraine and Russia’s changing views on the Islamic Republic have prompted the Kremlin to pay more attention to the issue. Diplomatic activities to accelerate the completion of railway and road infrastructure followed. Putin’s July visit to Tehran covered just these topics.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at the University of Europe and Director of Middle East Studies at Geocase, a Georgian think tank.