TEHRAN – A former Israeli official said it was impossible to curb Iran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program without finding a political solution.
Danny Sitrinowitz wrote in the Atlantic Council on January 19 that “Iran is moving forward with its enrichment program almost unhindered, taking the pain out of almost all non-political solutions.” ing.
Citrinowicz, former head of the Iran branch of the Israel Defense Intelligence Agency’s Research and Analysis Division (RAD), also said, “Iran’s ability to roll back the nuclear threat is highly unlikely under any scenario.” increase.
Below is an excerpt from his article titled “Netanyahu’s Iran Policy Expected to Fail Again”.
“Senior officials in the Biden administration understand that a return to the JCPOA is unlikely, but they seem to understand that there is no substitute for a political framework that will stop Iran from accelerating its nuclear program.”Shortly after Benjamin Netanyahu took office as prime minister for the sixth time in history, his government declared that their goal was to focus on Iran, especially its nuclear program.
It is clear from Netanyahu’s statements and actions, including the dispatch of Strategy Minister Ron Dahmer to Washington on January 9, that the prime minister has not changed his approach to Iranian files. Netanyahu will continue to oppose any nuclear deal with Tehran.
In this context, Netanyahu appears to be primarily focused on strengthening ties with Israel and the United States, thereby mobilizing global and regional powers to increase political and economic pressure on Tehran. But what was a difficult task for Netanyahu a few years ago is, for many reasons, becoming all but impossible in the current international climate.
The biggest problem Netanyahu has today is the fact that he will struggle to rally the Joe Biden administration. Iran is not at the center of the regime’s deal. A campaign in Ukraine and a dramatic increase in Chinese threats are more pressing issues for the regime than for Iran.
Moreover, it appears from the actions of the Biden administration that additional pressure could disrupt the equilibrium created with Tehran and hinder the possibility of a future political settlement. team will find it very difficult to convince anyone in Washington that they are on the right track.
Additionally, senior government officials understand that a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is unlikely, but that there is no substitute for a political framework that will stop Iran from accelerating its nuclear program. It seems that. This is in stark contrast to Netanyahu’s policy of precluding any negotiations with Tehran. Even if the Biden administration decides to increase pressure on Iran, it will do so with the aim of returning to a deal, not to eliminate the possibility of negotiations.
These policy gaps are sharpening against the backdrop of the Biden administration’s concerns about Netanyahu’s Iran policy.
Prime Minister to mobilize the support of American Jews in a campaign against Iran if the Prime Minister’s government passes laws that undermine their status in Israel or do things that would alienate the Jewish diaspora from the State of Israel It is also worth noting that the ability of . However, this does not mean that the Biden administration and Israel cannot work together on broader issues related to Iran, as evidenced by their shared concerns about the growing ties between Tehran and Moscow. But disagreements over the nuclear issue remain.
“If Netanyahu thinks mobilizing regional power will put pressure on Iran, he should think twice.”However, these are not the only obstacles to Netanyahu’s efforts to mobilize other countries. The Palestinian issue is a grave security and political challenge. The deteriorating security situation in the West Bank could force Israeli forces to focus their operations in the West Bank rather than elsewhere, increasing tensions with the international community.
Even if the Netanyahu regime were able to fully prioritize Iran’s escalating nuclear program in recent years, it is unclear whether it would significantly impede its adversaries’ advances. Since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, encouraged by the Netanyahu government, Iran has made dramatic progress in enrichment, overcoming all past technological obstacles and producing enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb. I am very close to getting it. This challenges any operational plan and raises the question: Even if the Natanz and Fordow facilities disappeared from the world tomorrow, would it be possible to erase the knowledge gained in Iran?
Moreover, Russia’s growing ties with Iran could make it more difficult for Israel to step up its covert operations in Tehran from a political and even security perspective. To counter the Donald Trump administration’s greatest pressure campaign, Tehran has regained deterrence and raised the bar through its “maximum resistance campaign” to “balance” Israel and the West. Unlike the Hassan Rouhani era, when the main political goal was to keep the nuclear deal, Iran under Ebrahim Raisi is more eager to retaliate against any collectivization. As such, the danger of war is increasing in the face of future movement activity by Israel.
If Prime Minister Netanyahu thinks the mobilization of regional powers led by Saudi Arabia will put pressure on Iran, he should think twice. Arab countries understand that this is the only way to reduce escalation with Iran and prefer to maintain dialogue channels and economic ties with Tehran. These countries fear a regional military conflict so much that it is difficult to support because it could affect their security.
All these obstacles face Netanyahu in mobilizing the Israeli public for a campaign against Iran, especially when Netanyahu’s actions are widely assumed to be a distraction from his ongoing corruption trial. facilitated by the difficulty of The allegations, and the widening rift between the right and left in Israel, will increase fears about the prime minister’s actions in the Iranian context. As a result, Netanyahu will struggle to win automatic support from the opposition.
In short, Netanyahu is expected to experience many difficulties in the process of persuading allies against Iran. But what is the strategic objective of this policy? After all, in the last few years, without a political framework and despite threats from all sides, Iran has advanced its enrichment program almost unhindered. It is clear that The ability to roll back the Iranian nuclear threat is highly unlikely under any scenario. Moreover, Iran reportedly has consensus on the right to enrich. Therefore, in the near future Iran will not dismantle its nuclear facilities under any scenario.
Since 2018, the huge gap between Israel’s Iran policy and the rest of the world’s policy has only widened. That said, it would be better for Israel to reconsider elements of Israeli policy that are currently unrealistic and make them more realistic. Moreover, adopting Netanyahu’s policy ignores the fact that the international community has decided that the best, and perhaps only, solution is diplomacy, and at best the world’s commitment to a deal with Iran. It rushed to sign and, at worst, failed to act, isolating Israel.
