In 2005, Corporal Alan Brackenberry of the British Army’s King’s Royal Hussars was traveling in a row of Land Rovers from Camp Abu Naji, Iraq. The blast killed Brackenberry instantly and injured three of his other personnel traveling in his vehicle.
According to multiple accounts of the incident, the improvised explosive device used an explosively formed penetrator (EFP). A copper plate welded onto a cylinder containing explosives. When detonated, the force of the explosive crushes the copper plate into a slug, which travels towards the target at supersonic speed.
Blackenbury’s vehicle was reportedly pierced by three bullets. Each Land Rover hole was less than an inch in diameter and was clad in copper. Additionally, the detonation was triggered by a passive infrared trigger designed to detonate the explosives when engine heat passed.
The incident marked a dramatic departure from the tactics normally employed by Shiite militias in the region. The United States secretly protested to Iran. The militia was known to have close ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah. A US protest filed in July 2005 revealed the belief that Iraqi militias could not access these weapons without Iran’s assistance.
By the end of 2006, EFP attacks accounted for 18% of US and allied deaths. They accounted for 30% of the deaths in the final quarter of the year. Iran has long been a supporter of the forces opposing the West, and the IRGC sent fighters and trainees to Lebanon to assist Hezbollah in its 1982 countering of Israeli aggression, and from there to foreign factions. increased support. But the Iraq War provides an interesting starting point for understanding Iran’s role in the proliferation of complex weapons.
In 2006, Hezbollah fired a C-802 anti-ship missile at the Israeli missile ship INS. spear I was cruising off the coast of Lebanon on my way back to Israel. Israeli intelligence told media outlets that about 100 of his IRGC personnel were in charge of importing, equipping and launching the missiles, along with Hezbollah fighters.
Prior to this, Hezbollah had mainly fired unguided rockets into Israel. Although problematic, it was possible to engage them, and although their lack of accuracy created uncertainty, there was no risk of a coordinated threat to Israeli infrastructure.
The missile attack was unusually advanced and could not have happened without the involvement of the IRGC. From this point on, Iran’s influence expands, most prominently in her support of three forces opposing the West: Yemen’s Houthis, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Ukraine’s Russia.
Hezbollah
The Israeli military is now making great efforts to prevent Iranian technology and expertise from entering Hezbollah’s arsenal. Hezbollah is estimated to have as many as 130,000 of her rockets, mostly unguided. However, Iran has failed to import a full-fledged missile, so it has been trying for more than a decade to provide its military with guidance kits that can be used to upgrade its unguided rockets.
This process, applied to Hezbollah’s Zelzal 2 rocket, involves attaching a navigation guidance control device to the rear of the warhead. According to his 2019 report from the UK-Israel Telecommunications Research Center, the entire process takes him three hours and costs between $5,000 and $10,000. The GPS kit used to upgrade the missile is about the size of a small suitcase, making it easy to export to Lebanon.
Hezbollah is also trying to develop the domestic industry needed to build guidance kits, which is a challenge given the type of facilities and personnel needed to do so. is a military college that operates a department specifically set up to teach missile upgrade techniques to Iran’s proxy forces.
If Hezbollah succeeds in upgrading its rocket guidance systems, it will allow for more precise strikes on Israel’s critical national infrastructure, complicating the Israeli Defense Force’s air defense operations. Doing so greatly increases Israel’s potential risk in the event of a war with Hezbollah.
Russia
Russia is the latest outlet for Iran’s proliferation of advanced precision strike weapons. The appearance of Shahed-136 munitions roaming Ukraine’s skies in September confirmed rumors that Iran had supplied Russia with arms. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested that Russia may have procured as many as 2,400 Shahed, which the Russian military calls him Geran-2.
There are elements of unknown Russian service use. The designation Geran-2, the Russian word for geranium, indicates that it may have been manufactured in Russia rather than Iran.
The Shahed-136’s strength is its range, often quoted as 2,000km. This has not been confirmed, but it seems that it can run at least several hundred kilometers. The drone is believed to navigate autonomously for parts of its journey, and may include full motion video capabilities for precise terminal-phase guidance in certain situations. Since this type of guidance has been used on Iranian missiles and drones in the past, it is reasonable to assume that the Shahed-136 includes a similar system.
The warhead is larger and often fires in waves compared to other Russian loitering munitions, the Lancet and KUB-BLA. Whether Russia will procure more weapons systems from Iran remains to be seen, but Shahed-136 and other Iranian drones procured for reconnaissance could provide some form of long-range strike capability to the Russian military. It is already clear that there is
Houthis
The Houthis have received the most extensive aid from Iran, with levels of support increasing significantly since 2014. As a result, the Houthis now possess a vast array of long-range ballistic missiles, loitering ammunition and attack drones. They have proven to be relatively competent in deployment. Organize attacks on Saudi Arabian oil installations with different types of ammunition arriving at the same time.
Some of the Houthi capabilities stem from former Yemeni arsenals and military personnel who joined the Houthis. Others, however, are clearly from Iran. For example, the Borkan-2H short-range ballistic missile is rated as a lighter version of Iran’s Qiam-1 missile, according to a UN panel of experts.
The Houthis make extensive use of multi-mission armed UAVs and other munitions to launch attacks on the MT. Mercer Street tankers, and the Aramco facility in Abqaiq. Iran is believed to be providing training to the Houthis, including his UAV operators, at the Kashan air base near the city of Isfahan. The base was reportedly visited by a Russian delegation before Iranian drones appeared in Ukraine.
With Iran’s backing, the Houthis now have the capability to carry out strikes against targets at strategic depths within Saudi Arabia. attacks are much higher than those that have little impact. Nonetheless, this is also an expensive venture for the Saudi state, especially when compared to the fairly minimal investment made by Iran.
What next?
Iran has been expanding its influence in Iraq and Syria for some time, creating additional avenues for the spread of its advanced weapons and expertise. Several of the attacks against US military bases in these countries have been confidently linked to the IRGC and its agents.
It is clear that Iran has an asymmetrical response to its many opponents, and its exports create a very difficult challenge to defeat. Offering expertise and small building blocks creates vague goals that even Israel’s advanced intelligence and targeting systems must work hard to overcome. Israeli sources claim to have severely degraded Hezbollah’s precision program, but the results of these dynamic operations have only a limited impact on proliferation.
In any case, it is clear that Western forces considering future deployments in the Middle East, Africa and perhaps even further abroad should expect to face an enemy supported and armed by Iran. would have markedly different characteristics from the support that enabled Iraqi Shia militias to increase their success rate against coalition forces. Likely multi-domain in nature, avoiding excessive attrition requires a robust air defense network, integrated nation-state intelligence, and a very short cycle from sensor to shooter.
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